Little existing work has systematically examined the factors that help terrorist groups survive or contribute to their failure. State support for terrorist groups is commonly thought to be a factor that helps groups to survive. I demonstrate with newly collected data that state sponsorship is not always helpful to terrorist groups. I show that the resources provided by sponsors increase a group's ability to maintain itself internally. However, when a group has a sponsor that provides it with safe haven the risk of group being forcefully eliminated by the target increases. I argue that sponsors that provide safe haven can have incentives to provide information to the target about the groups to avoid potential costs from target military operations within their territory. The key empirical findings suggest that state sponsorship is a less serious problem for target states than many previously thought.
to target counterterrorism. While sponsors have incentives to provide groups with resources so that they can successfully attack the target state, they also have incentives to avoid any costs or repercussions that may result from providing support. I argue that sponsors avoid costs, physical and political, from target military operations by providing information to the target about the groups they sponsor. Sponsors have the greatest incentive to do this when the group is based within their territory because an attempt to forcefully eliminate the group necessitates target military operations in the sponsor's territory. Thus, I argue that sponsorship can be a curse to groups when they rely upon their patron for a safe haven.
The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) illustrates this point. The JKLF was the most prominent and successful group fighting India in Kashmir until the early 1990s. The group began to receive generous support from Pakistan in the early 1980s.
3 Pakistan also provided the JKLF with safe haven from which to organize its attacks on India. However, the JKLF's relationship with Pakistan was not always beneficial. By 1990, the group began to suffer from its close relationship with its sponsor. The JKLF, who had come to rely on a privileged basing arrangement and support from Pakistan, suffered considerably from actions taken by Pakistan that undercut the group. In fact, the group's leadership even accused Pakistan of providing information about its whereabouts to Indian security forces.
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The group was successfully eliminated by Indian forces in 1996. I show that the experience of the JKLF is not sui generis. Rather, it is one of many cases in a larger unexplored pattern in state sponsorship and the fate of groups.
A terrorist group is defined as a group that uses terrorist tactics, meaning it deliberately targets civilians in pursuit of political goals. 5 The use of terrorist tactics does not preclude a group from using insurgent tactics as well. In fact, it has been observed that almost all groups that use insurgent tactics also use terrorist tactics, while it is not true that most groups using terrorist tactics are also insurgents. It is stronger groups that generally find 3 Byman 2005; Jamal 2009 . 4 Schofield 1996, 157. 5 Hoffman 2006; Byman 2005; Richardson 2006 the use of insurgent tactics attractive, while groups that are relatively small and weak tend to heavily rely on terrorist tactics. 6 The focus of this paper is on groups that heavily utilize terrorist tactics. Thus, while there is overlap between the groups I analyze and the groups studied in the literature on insurgency and civil war (e.g., Hezbollah in Lebanon), most of the groups analyzed here are not insurgents (e.g., Baader-Meinhof in West Germany).
In this paper, I demonstrate how sponsorship can both help and harm groups using newly collected data on state sponsorship. The key results of this paper suggest that sponsorship is many times not all that helpful to groups. First, I discuss previous literature on sponsorship and groups with foreign bases and develop theoretical expectations about the influence of state sponsorship on the fate of groups. To assess the empirical veracity of my argument,
I introduce newly collected data on state sponsorship and the basing arrangements of 648 terrorist groups. Next, I analyze this new data and find support for several key hypotheses.
Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings for the international relations literature and policy-makers.
State Sponsorship and the Survival of Groups
The questions of when and how terrorist groups fail has begun to elicit increased attention from scholars and policy-makers. However, there is little work that systematically delves into the factors that lead to a group's continued survival or downfall. 7 Furthermore, there are important unexplored distinctions among groups that fail in terms of how they fail.
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Theoretically, there are at least two main modes of group failure: internal dissolution and target elimination. 9 Despite the importance of the topic, almost no existing work systematically analyzes the factors that affect group failure by either internal or external means. Groups face a collective action problem in which their members can consider forming or joining other groups or simply leaving terrorism altogether. Accordingly, beyond espousing an ideology or goal that is attractive to potential members, groups must also provide members with enough compensation to make their outside options relatively unattractive.
14 Prominent outside options for group members are leaving the group for non-violent politics (i.e., politicization) and joining or forming an alternative group (i.e., defection or splintering). 
The provision of information to the US by Pakistan is especially striking given that Pakistan had intervened in order to help Mullah Baradar avoid being captured by the US in November,
2001.
Target states are better able to forcibly eliminate a group as they gain information about its organization and the location of its key bases. Active sponsors that also provide a safe haven have both the incentives and ability to provide important information and assistance to target states. Consequently, sponsors have greater capacity to meaningfully cooperate with the target in repressing the group relative to host states that are not sponsors (Carter, 2011) . Furthermore, given the importance of a stable territorial base to a group's military operations I argue that the negatives of receiving the key resource of safe haven from a sponsor can outweigh the positives from being provided such an important resource.
Hypothesis 2b. All else equal, if a group receives safe haven from its state sponsor, this increases the probability a group fails due to target elimination.
When the sponsor does not provide safe haven, the same incentives and ability to undercut the group are not present. First, a sponsor does not have the same incentives to avoid costs from military operations if it does not provide an important base to the group. While target states might occasionally carry out retaliatory strikes against a sponsor, the threat to do so is not nearly as credible when there are no significant group operations within the sponsor's borders. Second, even if sponsors are pressured into cooperating with the target, they do not have as much incentive or ability to hurt the group when they do not provide safe haven.
When the group has a significant base in sponsor territory, an active sponsor has intimate familiarity with the group's organization within its territory. However, when the sponsor simply provides other resources to the group, it has less ability to compromise the group's essential operations. 27 In sum, in the absence of a safe haven I expect the increased resources from sponsorship to have a negative effect on the probability a group is forcefully eliminated.
27 The ability of a host state to cooperate in a crackdown against a transnational group is a key factor in Carter (2011) . I argue here that hosts of a group that are also active sponsors have significantly more capacity relative to the group. Hypothesis 3. All else equal, having a state sponsor that does not provide a base decreases the probability a group fails due to target elimination.
The argument that sponsorship can ultimately hurt groups naturally leads to the question of why groups accept sponsorship. While sponsorship is turned down in some cases, I
argue that this is rare for several reasons. First, the influence of increased resources on the probability a group is able to maintain its organization can be great enough to outweigh disadvantages from becoming too close to a potentially fickle sponsor. Even relatively popular and strong groups find an influx of resources or a foreign base to be extremely hard to turn down when fighting against a government. The JKLF's decision to accept a closer relationship with Pakistan in 1986-1987 illustrates how groups accept sponsorship even when it is known to carry significant risk. When Amanullah Khan, the leader of the JKLF, was presented with an offer of more help from the Pakistani ISI, he asked "[h]ow could we trust and cooperate with the ISI, which had stabbed us twice in the past?" Second, a group can end as a result of an internal decision to abandon the use of terrorism.
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This coding dovetails nicely with the prior theoretical discussion of internal dissolution.
33 Jones and Libicki 2006. 34 I show in the appendix that it makes no difference in terms of the statistical results whether we treat these 27 groups as still active, as a separate category, or if we simply eliminate them from the analysis.
35 Jones and Libicki 2006. 36 See the supplemental materials for an alternative coding of internal dissolution. This alternative coding makes a distinction between groups that abandon violence because they are offered a role in peaceful politics from the vast majority of groups that abandon violence due to a lack of success or resolve among members. This distinction makes has no effect on any of the important results.
The information summarized above is used to construct the dependent variable used in the competing risks model. The dependent variable codes the status of each of the 648 groups in each year it remains active or in the year it fails. Thus, the dependent variable, y i,t , takes the following form: When a group fails for either reason in a given year t, it leaves the system and thus is not in the data the following year t + 1.
Independent Variables
Independent variables that measure sponsorship patterns and the basing arrangements of groups are of primary theoretical interest. Since there is currently no reliable database on state sponsorship that covers this time period, I collect new data on whether or not each of the 648 groups experience sponsorship in a given year. To assess hypotheses 1 and 3, Byman 2005, 224-229. 44 In several cases, a group simultaneously experiences state support from several countries, although the majority of sponsored groups do not. I coded a variable that records the number of sponsors a group has in a given year and find results that are substantively identical to those reported in the results section.
military operations are likely sufficient to support the continued existence of the group if it loses another base. Thus, we should only expect the the logic that leads to hypothesis 2a to hold when the sponsor provides a base for essential group operations. Second, bases that are not directly related to a group's military operations are unlikely to be the focus of target attacks. Consequently, if there is no threat of damage from target elimination attempts, a sponsor has no incentives to provide information. Thus, the logic that leads to hypothesis 2b will also only possibly hold when a sponsor provides a base directly related to military planning and/or operations. Third, it is relatively easy to obtain reliable information across groups on whether a group carries out sustained military operations or has its leadership housed in a country. Although it would be interesting to obtain information on other types of organizational footprints such as fundraising offices, it is difficult to consistently find reliable information on this. Furthermore, it is also relatively difficult to identify whether the state in question explicitly supports such activities. 46 In contrast, Hamas is not coded as having a safe haven in Qatar or Yemen, despite extensive evidence that the group has offices in those countries. 47 The offices are primarily related to fundraising operations and the group's leadership is not permanently based in either country. Thus, neither of these countries is considered a safe haven that Hamas could relocate to or rely on in the event it lost another base (i.e., in Syria). Out of 118 groups that experienced state sponsorship, 67 relied on a sponsor for safe haven at some point.
One potential concern is that reliance on a state sponsor for a safe haven is a proxy Havens variable is a reasonable measure of group strength as stronger and more durable groups are likely to enjoy more safe havens. Third, the estimation of grouped duration models ensures that any additional information about the strength or health of a group that is positively correlated with how long a group has survived is systematically accounted for.
Thus, given that a group that has survived for 10 or 15 years is likely stronger than a group that is 1 or 2 years old, the empirical model explicitly takes this into account.
Finally, I also assess the influence of the retraction of state sponsorship. Accordingly, I
code whether or not a group has lost sponsorship. A group is coded as having lost sponsorship in a given year if it experienced sponsorship in any prior year but not in that year. I distinguish between cases in which a group is dropped by a sponsor that provides it with safe haven (i.e., Sponsorship ended -Safe Haven) and those in which the sponsor does not (i.e., Sponsorship dropped -No Safe Haven). This ensures that the effects of SponsorshipNo Safe Haven and Sponsorship -Safe Haven are interpreted relative to the case in which no sponsorship was ever received.
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[ 48 United States Department of Homeland Security 2008. Additionally, careful (i.e., line by line) comparison of the attacks data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) with the group data from Jones and Libicki provides a nice quality check. Almost all groups that carried out multiple attacks across multiple years according to GTD is also in the group data.
49 I also tried lagging the number of attacks by a year and found results very similar to those reported below.
50 Note that the total number of groups that experienced sponsorship at some point in table 1 is not the sum of the number that experienced sponsorship with a safe haven and the number that experienced sponsorship with no safe haven. This is the case because several groups experienced both types of sponsorship, either simultaneously, or during different periods of time. The same is true of losing sponsorship. The results of two different competing risks models are presented in table 2. The only difference between the two models is that Model 1 (i.e., columns 2 and 3) does not include a Cold war dummy variable, while Model 2 (i.e., columns 4 and 5) does. For each of the two models, the column labeled "Internal Dissolution" shows the effect each variable has on the probability of failure by internal dissolution, while the column labeled "Forceful Elimination"
shows the results for failure as a result of police or military action. Throughout the results section, I refer to the substantive effects of the statistically significant variables shown in table 3. The table is based on model 2 and shows the effect of each statistically significant variable relative to the case when all other variables are held at their median. The first row shows the predicted probability of failure as a result of internal dissolution and forceful elimination when all variables are held at their median or modal values.
61 Each subsequent row shows the substantive effect of changing a statistically significant variable on the two latent probabilities of failure. For example, the second row illustrates the effect of changing the Policy change variable from 0 to 1. The first column of the second row shows the probability of internal dissolution for a group seeking a change in policy, 0.051. The second and third columns show the change in probability from the median case, +0.023, and the percentage change in probability from the median case, +82%.
[ Table 3 Examination of the results for internal dissolution and forceful elimination in both models illustrates important differences in how sponsorship patterns affect the two modes of failure.
60 Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004. A potential problem with separate logit models, separate Cox models, and multinomial logit is that they all require the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) among the competing modes of failure. I use the Hausman and Small-Hsaio tests and find that the multinomial logit model reported in table 2 does not violate IIA.
61 The modal group is Left-wing and seeks the goal of Regime Change.
The existence of a sponsor that does not provide safe haven in a given year significantly decreases the probability of internal dissolution in Model 1 at the 10 percent level, which provides some support for hypothesis 1. However, if we include a variable that indicates whether it is the cold war period (i.e., before 1992), the sponsorship without safe haven variable loses statistical significance, while the cold war variable is negative and significant.
This suggests that the support for hypothesis 1 in Model 1 is driven by sponsorship patterns during the cold war. Several states provided support to a number of groups during the cold war and also rarely provided safe haven. Most prominent among cold war era sponsors that rarely provide safe haven are Libya, Cuba, the U.S.S.R., China, and the U.S. Almost all of these states had greatly cut back on the support they lent to groups by 1991. Furthermore, support in most cases was ideologically motivated, with Cuba, the U.S.S.R., and China generally supporting leftist groups (e.g., Cuba's support for Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left), the U.S. supporting anti-communist groups like the Contras in Nicaragua, and Libya supporting a surprisingly wide range of revolutionary groups such as the Irish Republican Army and the Pattani Liberation Organization. 62 A consequence of this trend in sponsorship during the cold war is that the effect of this aid on groups' abilities to avoid internal dissolution is not significant if we estimate a "cold war effect".
63
In contrast to the results for sponsorship without safe haven, sponsorship with a safe haven does not significantly decrease the probability of failure by internal dissolution in either model, although the sign is in the expected direction. Furthermore, I do not find support for hypothesis 3 as sponsorship without safe haven does not significantly affect the probability of target elimination, although the coefficient is in the expected direction. This suggests that sponsorship with no safe haven is primarily helpful to groups in maintaining their organization and retaining their membership and is less helpful in avoiding target elimination.
The results provide considerable evidence that receiving sponsorship with safe haven is not helpful to a group's prospects. The coefficients for Sponsorship -Safe Haven are positive and significant at the 5 percent level in both models, which provides considerable support for hypothesis 2b. In contrast, hypothesis 2a does not find support, which indicates that on average the downside for groups of relying on a sponsor for safe haven outweigh the positives of having this important resource. The results in table 3 indicate that when a group relies upon its sponsor for safe haven the probability of target elimination is 114% greater than if the group does not (and has never had) sponsorship. 64 The hazard plot in figure 1 demonstrates this relationship for a group that received sponsorship with safe haven for 12
years. This implies that having a sponsor that provides safe haven entails more risk than being without a sponsor. At first glance, this result seems to be at odds with the findings of the civil war literature that civil conflicts that involve transnational groups last longer.
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However, the results in table 2 only apply to groups that receive active sponsorship and safe haven from an outside state, not any groups that enjoy a safe haven. A foreign base can be provided willingly, i.e., by a sponsor, or can be provided in large part because the state is too weak to prevent it. 66 The negative and significant effect that the Number of safe havens has on the probability of forceful elimination suggests that groups benefit from safe haven in states that are not sponsors.
The significant and positive coefficients for Sponsorship ended -Safe Haven indicates that the retraction of sponsorship from a state that provides safe haven further increases the probability of forceful elimination. In fact, if a group loses sponsorship from a state that provides safe haven it is 267% more likely to fail than if it had never received sponsorship and 71% more likely to fail relative to when it received sponsorship. Figure 1 shows this relationship for a group that loses sponsorship with safe haven after 12 years. In contrast, Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 2008; Salehyan 2008. 21 and the number of safe havens it enjoys are reasonable measures of group strength.
The only statistically significant variable that the two modes of failure have in common is target state per capita income. Groups are more likely to fail for internal reasons and to be forcefully eliminated by wealthier target states. This is consistent with the findings that civil wars are more likely to end in government victory as GDP per capita increases and that conditions are more ripe for the emergence of groups in poor countries.
71 Figure 1 shows further evidence of the substantive effects of the Sponsorship -Safe Haven and the Sponsorship Ended -Safe Haven variables in the context of the hazard of group failure (i.e., the probability a group fails as a function of how long it has existed). The solid gray line depicts the probability a group with no sponsor fails for internal reasons, while the three black lines depict the probability a group is forcefully eliminated under three alternative scenarios. The solid black line shows the case in which a group does not experience sponsorship for its entire life. The dotted black line depicts the case in which a group experiences sponsorship but does not rely on the sponsor for a safe haven. Finally, the dashed black line illustrates the case in which a group is dropped by a sponsor that provided safe haven for 12 years.
Examination of figure 1 demonstrates that the shape of the hazard is strikingly different across the two modes of failure. The effect of group age is much stronger for internal dissolution. The probability a group fails for internal reasons is relatively high when a group initially emerges but falls quickly after a group survives for several years. In particular, if a group survives for 8-10 years, the probability it fails is much lower for several decades with a slight increase if the group survives for over 30 years (which is uncommon in the data).
Groups are at relatively high risk of failure for internal reasons when they are relatively "young" (i.e., have existed for less than 6 years), while groups that have existed for around a decade become relatively immune to this risk. 71 Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003 
22
The black lines in figure 1 demonstrate that the probability a group is forcefully eliminated decreases at a considerably slower rate relative to the probability of internal dissolution as groups age. The hazard is decreasing, but the difference in probability between a new group and one that has existed for ten years is not as great as it is for the probability of internal dissolution. Thus, there is not strong evidence of an "age threshold" after which a group becomes relatively secure from forceful elimination.
Conclusion
Much ink has been spilled and hours of broadcast time have been spent to discuss the problem of states sponsoring terrorist groups. This discussion is typically framed in terms of how sponsorship improves the fortunes of a group, which in turn makes eliminating a group more difficult. The presumption has largely been that sponsorship is a major problem for target states because it makes enemy groups all that much more able to survive and continue to inflict pain. However, no study has systematically explored what factors affect whether groups fail internally or are forcefully eliminated, let alone how state sponsorship influences their fate. I argue and demonstrate that state sponsorship can negatively affect the fate of groups.
The preceding analysis implies that sponsorship may not be as serious of a problem for target governments as many policy-makers have presumed. In fact, sponsorship does not seem to significantly help groups to avoid forceful elimination. Furthermore, groups who rely on their sponsor for a safe haven are more likely to be eliminated. Moreover, groups who receive sponsorship without safe haven are not significantly more likely to avoid forceful elimination and groups that rely on their sponsor for a safe haven are not significantly less likely to fail for internal reasons. Thus, sponsorship is by no means always a good thing for groups (and a bad thing for target states). Comparison of the above results to some key findings in the literature on foreign bases and civil war also suggests that sponsorship is less of a problem for targets of violent groups than the problem of failed states. Salehyan shows that when rebel groups in civil conflicts have foreign bases, whether provided by a sponsor or not, the conflicts are of significantly longer duration.
72 Examination here of the cases in which a group has a foreign base that is provided by a sponsor demonstrates that this set of cases is not so problematic. This point is further bolstered by the finding that safe haven that is not provided by a sponsor lowers the risk of forceful elimination. This set of findings suggest that active state sponsorship is less the problem than weak or failing states hosting groups. In sum, from a target state's perspective it is better to have an active sponsor with some degree of power over a group relative to a weak host that cannot do much about a group.
Several policy implications for target states follow from the preceding analysis. The results of the competing risks model nicely highlight how group failure via internal dissolution and failure as a result of successful target counterterrorism actions are quite distinct processes. The hazard plots in figure 1 imply that the forceful elimination of groups becomes increasingly relevant as groups age. Although internal dissolution occurs much more frequently, it becomes relatively unlikely after a group survives for about 10 years which implies that there is an "age threshold" beyond which groups are likely to avoid internal dissolution. Additionally, target states in conflict with a group that is at least 8-10 years old should pay close attention to sponsorship patterns. The results show that groups who depend upon a sponsor for safe haven are on average more vulnerable. Thus, if a target state faces a relatively old group that receives safe haven from a sponsor the elimination of this safe haven is a reasonable strategy. For example, Turkey's successful effort to remove Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK from Syria is an example in which elimination of an important safe haven proved damaging to a relatively mature group. 
